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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE AUDIO HOME RECORDING ACT OF 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Audio Home Recording Act' (AHRA) to
regulate the new area of Digital Audio Technology' (DAT) raises
several questions in light of the Constitution and the Copyright Act
of 1976. This Comment addresses two areas in which problems
may exist with the AHRA. First, the AHRA is inconsistent with
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.3 The legislation presents
two constitutional concerns: it allows copyright holders to control
access to works and it subjects public domain works to copyright
protection. Second, the AHRA makes no allowance for the fair use
of a copyrighted work under section 107 of the Copyright Act.4
The deficiencies in the AHRA most likely reflect the negotiation
process behind the legislation;5 the Act grew out of negotiations
and lobbying efforts by special interest groups in the music and
electronics industries. Congress's reliance on these special interest
groups has resulted in a statutory subsidy for the music industry
that conflicts with and restricts the public's rights under the
17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (Supp. 1992).
Digital Audio Technology uses computer technology to create the same high sound
quality as laser compact discs. The difference is that DAT employs cassette tapes rather
than compact discs. These tapes can be copied on DAT recorders. Further, copies of DAT
tapes do not lose sound quality or clarity because the computer technology converts music
into binary codes rather than simply copying the sounds. This conversion eliminates the loss
in sound quality experienced with traditional recording devices. Eric Fleischmann, The
Impact of Digital Technology on Copyright Law, 8 CoMPuTER/L.J. 1, 3-5 (1987).
' "To promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors...
the exclusive Right to their... Writings..." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
" See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV.
275, 277-79 (1989) (arguing that copyright law problems stem from Congress's reliance on
special interest group negotiations for copyright legislation).
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Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act of 1976.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE LEGISLATION
The AHRA seeks to regulate DAT equipment because the
equipment's technology facilitates the creation of near-perfect
copies of copyrighted sound recordings.' According to proponents
of the legislation, such high-quality copies threaten the music
industry and the value of sound recording copyrights.7 In light of
this threat, Congress attempted to balance music industry concerns
with society's right of access to the new technology.' This balanc-
ing resulted in an agreement in which the music industry promises
not to sue consumers or DAT manufacturers in return for royalty
payments.9
The AHRA royalty plan ° requires payments equaling two
percent of the transfer price of a DAT recorder and three percent
of a blank DAT tape.1 The royalty applies to all consumer models
of DAT recorders 2 and blank DAT tapes 13 sold in the United
6 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 1992).
7 House Panel Approves Bill on Digital Audio Recording and Home Audio Taping, 44 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 324 (August 6, 1992).
s "The purpose of H.R. 3204 [the Audio Home Recording Act] is to provide a legal and
administrative framework within which digital audio recording technology may be made
available to consumers." Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3578.
9 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (Supp. 1992).
10 §§ 1003-1007.
§§ 1004(a)-(b). The plan determines the transfer price as either the value amount
entered with United States Customs upon importation of the DAT equipment or the
manufacturer's freight on board (FOB) price for domestic products. If the manufacturing
entities are related, then the transfer price is the reasonable arm's-length price under all
applicable IRS codes. § 1001(12).
1'2 § 1001(3) ("A 'digital audio recording device' is any machine or device of a type
commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with or
as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is designed
or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied
recording for private use ... .") (emphasis added).
13 § 1001(4XA) (A 'digital audio recording medium' is any material object in a form
commonly distributed for use by individuals, that is primarily marketed or most commonly
used by consumers for the purpose of making digital audio copied recordings by use of a
digital audio recording device ... .") (emphasis added).
336
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States. The Act excludes spoken word recordings, 14 computer
program recordings," professional model DAT recorders,1 6 and
nonmusical sound recording devices.
1 7
Royalty payments may not exceed eight dollars on single
component DAT recorders or twelve dollars on a multi-unit stereo
system.'8 Although the individual royalty per unit is small, the
royalty system will raise a large amount of money. Government
figures predict that royalties will equal an estimated 188 million
dollars in the first two years. 9 The Copyright Office will super-
vise the distribution of AHRA funds,'0 the bulk of which are
directed to the music industry.2'
The AHRA distribution plan results in recording companies
taking approximately forty percent of overall AHRA proceeds,2
which will amount to seventy-six million dollars in the first two
14 § 1001(5XB)(i) (including spoken sound recordings with incidental musical accompani-
ment).
15 § 1001(5XBXii).
16 § 1001(3XA). Professional models of DAT products would be used in places like
recording studios.
17 § 1001(3XB) (including devices such as answering machines and dictation machines).
" § 1004(aX3). Single component systems generally cost approximately $1000 each.
Steven Levine, The Digital Duel Could Be Ending, Manufacturers, Music Industry Reach
Pact, WASH. POST, July 11, 1991, at B8.
"' This figure represents the estimated amount for 1993 and 1994, with amounts
increasing in the future. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3578, 3605. Although some commentators doubt the commercial
success of DAT and its subsequent sales and royalties, this Comment assumes these figures
to be accurate. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for potential
commercial failure of DAT products).
'0 § 1007. See also David Goldman, DAT Royalty Payment Regulations Released, J.
PROPRIETARY RTs., May 1993, at 24 (showing that manufacturers are required to submit
.statements of account" and pay royalty payments before May 15, 1993); David Goldman,
Group Formed To Distribute DAT Royalties, J. PROPRIETARY RTs., Mar. 1993, at 41 (noting
that nonprofit corporation was formed to distribute royalties and settle disputes arising
under AHRA).
2 For instance, two-thirds of the proceeds are allocated to the Sound Recording Fund and
one-third is allocated to the Musical Works Fund. § 1006. Approximately sixty percent of
the Sound Recording Fund goes to record companies while approximately forty percent is
received by featured performers. Id. The Musical Works Fund divides its proceeds evenly
between music publishers and music or song writers. Id.
' These figures are only approximations to give the reader an idea of the overall division
of AHRA funds. For the background of this distribution plan, see Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3578, 3591-94.
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years, according to government estimates. 23 Featured musicians
and performers (not in their capacity as song writers) will take
approximately twenty-six percent of overall proceeds, equaling
approximately fifty million dollars over two years. Finally, music
publishers and music writers will each take only sixteen and one-
half percent of the overall proceeds, or approximately thirty million
dollars in a two year period.
In addition to establishing a royalty system, the AHRA requires
that all DAT recorders24 be equipped with a Serial Copy Manage-
ment System (SCMS). 25  Without the SCMS, tenth-generation
DAT copies would sound as clear as an original master copy
because DAT technology can eliminate the scratches and hisses of
analog equipment.26 The music industry feared that these clear
DAT copies would greatly diminish sales of prerecorded works
because consumers could copy a borrowed prerecorded copy.
Although some commentators have argued that the SCMS is a
more viable copyright protection device than royalties, 27 this
Comment limits its discussion to the legality and policy consider-
ations of the AHRA's royalty system.
23See supra note 19 and accompanying text (estimating that royalty system will take in
over 188 million dollars in first two years).
2 § 1002. Any device that circumvents the SCMS is also prohibited under the AHRA.
§ 1002(c). See also Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 1992
U.S.C.C.ALN. (106 Stat.) 3578, 3579-80 (describing value of SCMS system to protect
copyrights).
2' § 1002. The SCMS is a device that can distinguish between a prerecorded tape and one
that is a copy of a prerecorded tape. The device prevents a DAT recorder from making a
copy of the latter. Michael Plumleigh, Digital Audio Tape: New Fuel Stokes the Smoldering
Home Taping Fire, 37 UCLA L. REV. 733, 761 (1990).
For further descriptions of DAT functioning and the technological advances facilitated
by DAT, see Fleischmann, supra note 2, at 3-5; Todd Page, Digital Audio Tape Machines:
New Technology or Further Erosion of Copyright Protection?, 77 KY. L.J. 441, 445 (1989);
Douglas R. Weimer, Digital Audio Recording Technology: Challenges to American Copyright
Law, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455 (1990).
SSee, e.g., Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 762 (arguing that SCMS, which is limited to
small set number of copies, would better balance copyright protection and private use than
only prohibiting copies of copies).
338 [Vol. 1:335
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE AHRA
The founding fathers believed that learning and education are
essential to a more productive democracy and a better society.'
This belief is reflected in the Copyright Clause, which gives
Congress the authority to grant authors limited monopolies in their
works to ensure society's access to ideas.' Ensuring access to
ideas is the primary goal of the Clause because learning hinges on
open access.30  Specifically, the Clause serves this goal by autho-
rizing Congress to legislate copyright law to promote learning
through the dissemination of ideas.3 ' This policy ensures society's
right of access to copyrighted works by creating a limited copyright
monopoly for authors.32 In addition, the Clause promotes learning
through access by protecting the public domain and the works it
encompasses.' Works in the public domain are available to
everyone for free use.
' See L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and 'the exclusive Right" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL PROP.
L. 1, 26 (1993) (discussing founding fathers' approach to copyright in 1790).
' "To promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors...
the exclusive Right to their... Writings and Discoveries..." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
'o See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ([T]he primary object in
conferring the monopoly lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors
of authors.*); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("[Tihe limited grant [of the monopoly privilege of copyright] is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved.").
31 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ([P]rivate
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts.').
32 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering the Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "); Patterson, supra
note 28, at 26 ("The most important natural-law right of the Copyright Clause is not the
right of the author to gain a profit, but the right of the people to learn: the future of society
is determined by the learning of its citizens."); Weimer, supra note 26, at 458-61 (describing
balance between rights of authors and rights of society in copyright law).
3The public domain includes works that no longer belong to an author because the term
of copyright protection has expired or the work was not copyrighted originally. These works
are available for everyone to use without a concern of infringement. See MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYIGHT § 1.05[A][2] (1992) (discussing how works may not be
recaptured after they have entered public domain).
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A. ACCESSIBILITY AND THE AUTHOR'S RIGHTS
The Copyright Clause ensures that society has access to copy-
righted works by rewarding authors with a limited copyright
monopoly.' As codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, an author's
monopoly is limited both in scope and duration.' Such limita-
tions exist to protect the public's right of access while also encour-
aging the author to create and publish his work.' Accordingly, if
the Constitution is to have meaning, any copyright legislation,
including the AHRA, must respect this balance. Thus, Congress
should grant only that monopoly necessary to encourage the public
circulation of works.
Arguably, however, the AHRA increases authors' monopolistic
control without first determining what incentives are necessary to
'4 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 ("[The limited grant] is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired.") (emphasis added).
3517 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. 1991), which reads:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;,
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id. (emphasis added).
' See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (" 'The sole interest
of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to the
author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius."
(quoting Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))).
37 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the
limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.").
340
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encourage song writers to create and publish. For example, if song
writers would continue to publish in spite of DAT copies, then any
increased monopoly is unnecessary and an inappropriate limit on
society's right of access to works. Such a determination should be
made before Congress enacts legislation that expands the copyright
monopoly.
The AHRA increases the copyright monopoly by guaranteeing
profits to the music industry" and allowing the industry to control
access to DAT equipment. Guaranteeing profits is not part of the
limited statutory monopoly, which only protects an author's
opportunity to benefit from his work. Even if the actual royalty
amount per unit is small, the guaranteed royalties still exceed the
limited monopoly and encroach on the public's right of access free
from excessive copyright holder control.
The AHRA is also problematic because its royalty plan guaran-
tees profits primarily to record companies rather than to song
writers. Recording companies will take over seventy-six million
dollars while song writers will take only approximately thirty
million dollars.39 This is contrary to the Copyright Clause, which
requires Congress to reward authors for publishing their creative
works. That is, the Constitution does not empower Congress to
promote the interests of recording company entrepreneurs who are
not the creative sources of the copyrighted works.
In addition, the AHRA increases the copyright monopoly by
allowing the music industry to charge royalty fees for access to
DAT recorders and blank tapes, which members of the electronics
industry designed and produced.40 Thus, the AHRA allows one set
of copyright holders to charge consumers for access to another's
works. This is an inappropriate use of copyright law, which grants
a limited monopoly only to authors for their works.
The fact that the electronics industry agreed to such a system
may seem strange. One explanation is that some electronics
' The guarantee of royalties to AHRA beneficiaries is at the cost of consumers. See
Levine, supra note 18, at BS. (" 'It's a toss-up,' said Michelle Mendelson, a spokesman for
Consumers Union. 'It's unfortunate that [the AHRA will entail higher prices, but at least
it is getting the technology out to the consumer.' ").
See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting distribution of AHRA proceeds).
40 House Panel Approves Bill on Digital Audio Recording and Home Audio Taping, 44 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 324 (Aug. 6, 1992).
1994] 341
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corporations also own recording companies.41 Moreover, the
electronics industry as a whole arguably profits under the AHRA
because it passes the royalty fees to consumers and then indirectly
receives royalties back through their subsidiary recording compa-
nies and the AHRA. In this way, the AHRA is a winning proposi-
tion for everyone, except perhaps the American consumer.
Therefore, the AHRA arguably conflicts with the Copyright
Clause because it allows copyright holders to enlarge the copyright
monopoly and to encroach on society's right of access to copyrighted
works. Both results conflict with the policies inherent in the
constitutional grant of a limited monopoly.
B. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
A second potential constitutional problem with the AHRA is that
it may give copyright protection to works in the public domain.
The public domain consists of works for which the term of copyright
protection has expired or that were never copyrighted.42 Exam-
ples of public domain works include the writings of Shakespeare or
the music of Mozart. Further, government works automatically
enter the public domain.43 Such works are available for use by
everyone without being subjected to a copyright royalty, thereby
promoting learning in society.44
Under the AHRA, a royalty is levied on all DAT equipment at the
time of sale. Because the AHRA does not distinguish between the
recording of works in the public domain and those protected by
copyright, it inevitably charges consumers for use of public domain
works. Specific instances in which the AHRA royalty might apply
inappropriately to works in the public domain include a historic
release of Thomas Edison's original recordings or a government
41 See infra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining negotiation process behind AHRA
in light of electronics companies and recording companies being one and the same).
"Patterson, supra note 28, at 18-21. See also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 430 (1991) (denying copyright protection for names and telephone numbers that
plaintiff had alphabetized for placement in its telephone directory, thus ensuring defendant's
right of access to use this non-copyrightable information).
See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) ("Copyright protection... is not available for any work of
the United States Government .... ').
"See supra note 33 (defining public domain and works therein).
[Vol. 1:335342
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work such as a recording of the United States Navy Band.
Thus, the policies behind the Copyright Clause raise several
questions about the validity of the AHRA. First, the Act's royalty
system will increase the copyright monopoly at the cost of access to
works available through DAT technology. Second, the royalty
system fails to distinguish between the use of copyrighted works
and the use of public domain works, and wrongfully charges
royalties on the latter.
IV. FAIR USE OF DAT
A. FAIR USE ANALYSIS
Congress codified the fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act of
197645 to address fact-specific usage questions. Fair use allows
use of a copyrighted work without infringing that work if the use
satisfies a balancing test of four factors.46 Being a judicially
"17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 1991). Section 107 reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.; see also Litman, supra note 5, at 340-42 (describing legislative history of section 107
during its enactment into Copyright Act of 1976).
"17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). For further analysis of the fair use factors, see William W.
Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1661 (1988) (analyzing
fair use from economic or efficiency viewpoint and then from utopian viewpoint); Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (arguing for economic and market
analysis of fair use based on three factors: (1) whether market failure necessitates allowing
fair use, (2) whether allowing fair use is socially desirable, and (3) whether use will cause
substantial injury to incentive for artists and authors to create).
9
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created doctrine later codified by Congress, the fair use doctrine
has been the subject of considerable case law and academic
analysis.47
Fair use analysis may be applicable to making a copy with DAT
equipment in certain situations," and if the private use of DAT
copies of copyrighted works does qualify as fair use, AHRA royalties
are inappropriate. For instance, consider the home recording of an
entire album that is broadcast over the radio, for subsequent
personal use. Radio stations sometimes play copyrighted albums
in their entirety as part of the station's programming. This
example is analogous to the factual situation in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios.49 Sony involved the recording
of broadcast television shows by consumers for later viewing-an
activity known as time-shifting.50 A suit was instituted against
VCR manufacturers for contributing to consumers' infringing
activities. 1
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use. The first factor of the
fair use analysis addresses the purpose and character of the
infringing use and focuses on whether the use was commercial or
nonprofit educational in nature.52 A basis for this factor is the
Copyright Clause because it requires that copyrighted works
promote learning.53 Further, the Copyright Act distinguishes
"' See, e.g., Fleischmann, supra note 2, at 9 (criticizing doctrine of fair use as imprecise);
Weimer, supra note 26, at 461-65 (noting that some courts view fair use as good safety valve
for rigid copyright application and other courts view it as source of unresolved ambiguities
and as often applied prematurely). But see, Patterson, supra note 46, at 36-37 (arguing that
fair use should be read broadly in order to properly interpret free speech limitations within
Copyright Clause).
' See also, L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1
(1987) (arguing that first fair use factor of nature of use protects consumer private use
completely, and only competitor-users should be subject to rest of fair use analysis).
4 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding fair use applicable to time-shifting copies of television
broadcasts made by private consumers on their home videotape recorder).
' Id. at 423 (1984) (noting that time-shifting is "the practice of recording a program to
view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it").
" For analysis ofthe contributory infringement issue, see id. at 442-47; see also Nintendo
of Am. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("Absent direct
infringement, there is no contributory infringement."), aftd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
2 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
53 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
344 [Vol. 1:335
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between the copyrighted work and a copy of that work:" the
owner of a particular copy has a right to use that work as long as
it does not interfere with an author's rights under section 106."'
In Sony, the Court equated private use with nonprofit use and
held that making a time-shifting copy of a broadcast television
show for private home enjoyment constituted fair use.w The
Court noted that the work was transmitted free of charge over the
broadcast airwaves, and the copy was a time-shifting one.5" No
evidence in the case indicated that a consumer had published or
otherwise attempted to profit from a time-shifting copy." Based
on this argument, some courts have held that a private and
noncommercial use is presumed to be a fair use.5"
A court reasonably could extend the nonprofit and private fair
use in Sony to the hypothetical DAT usage described above. The
hypothetical DAT consumer is recording a work off the radio
airwaves for noncommercial private enjoyment. The two situations
are similar, as highlighted by the DAT user's motives and inten-
tions. He is taping a work that he received free over the radio and
is merely enjoying it later.6° The consumer has not attempted to
benefit commercially from the work or from the author's publishing
rights. Therefore, focusing on the private nature of a consumer's
actions, the Sony rationale embraces this example.61
' See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) (separating copyrighted work from copies of work, thus
limiting copyright holder's control over copyrighted work).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). See supra note 35 (providing text of section).
" Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447-50 (1984).
a? Id. at 449.
5Id.
9Nintendo of Am. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd,
964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
o See Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 742 (making copy of work for your car would
exemplify form of place-shifting analogous to time-shifting in Sony).
61 Although not part of the Sony case or the hypothetical, one could imagine a consumer
borrowing a prerecorded copyrighted work and making a copy without purchasing the work.
One could argue that every allegedly private nonprofit copy displaces a commercial sale, and
thus, all are profit-motivated attempts to avoid paying for a copyrighted work. Weimer,
supra note 26, at 484. As a further argument against the private DAT user, the permanent
librarying of copies would mitigate against a finding of fair use because the Sony Court
limited its holding to time-shifting or ephemeral copies. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448-51 (1984).
However, three points argue in favor of the borrowing consumer. First, a copyright holder
does not control a particular copy once it has been sold. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988) (enacting
1994] 345
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An additional issue, the educational aspect, has a bearing on
analysis of the first fair use factor. This aspect gives preference to
educational uses of copyrighted works. The Ninth Circuit weighed
this aspect heavily when it decided the Sony case. 2 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit and noted that
distinguishing what is beneficial to society from what is beneficial
to an individual wrongfully reduces fair use to a two-dimensional
question.' Thus, the fact that the hypothetical DAT user is
engaged in a non-educational use does not undermine a finding of
fair use. In light of Sony, the first factor supports a finding of fair
use for the hypothetical DAT user.
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work. The nature of the
copyrighted work, the second fair use factor, addresses whether
society would be benefitted by additional access to a work." If
further access would benefit society, the fair use doctrine should
apply. The hypothetical DAT usage would fulfill this factor because
it would improve access to copyrighted works. Arguably, DAT
technology is beneficial for consumers, society, and authors. A
consumer benefits from DAT's higher sound quality and the
convenience of hearing that quality in different locations. Society
benefits because better access will encourage new ideas and works.
An author benefits because increased exposure may pique the
first sale doctrine as limit on copyright monopoly). Consumers are thus free to use a work
as they wish so long as they do not appropriate the copyright holder's right to copy and vend
for profit. Id. Second, section 106 does not guarantee an author the highest return on his
work and thus, certain losses are beyond its scope. Finally, a borrower's actions will not
violate the enumerated rights of section 106 because society's right to copy as a fair use is
superior to a copyright holder's right to control a work. L. Ray Patterson, Understanding
Fair Use, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 249, 260-61 (1992).
62 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
464 U.S. 417 (1984). See also Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home
Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REv. 1505 (1982) (arguing same position
as that of court of appeals in Sony for home sound recording context). But see Fisher, supra
note 46, at 1684-86 (noting how Sony Court found that educational productivity was too
vague and controversial standard of analysis).
a Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (1984) ("[Tlhe Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any
'equitable rule of reason' analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of 'fair
use' is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 'productive'....
That understanding of 'fair use' was erroneous .... ).
"17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988). See supra note 45 (providing text of statute); Sony, 659 F.2d
at 972 ("The courts inquire whether the nature of the material is such that additional access
'would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information.' ").
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interest of other consumers and improve sales."
In response, some have argued that DAT tapes would not satisfy
this second factor because musical works are creative, and thus,
less likely to be grounds for fair use than informational works."
Although this distinction appears in some lower court opinions, 7
the Supreme Court in Sony left this question open by not analyzing
the second factor in depth.' Nevertheless, one can argue that the
hypothetical DAT usage satisfies this second factor because DAT
will improve access to copyrighted works and benefit society.
3. The Amount of the Use. Analysis under the third factor, the
amount of the use, generally holds that the copying of an entire
work is presumptively unfair.' In spite of this presumption,
however, the Sony Court extended fair use to time-shifting copies
of entire television broadcasts.70 The Court noted that a consumer
originally was invited to watch the entire broadcast, which weighed
in favor of finding fair use.7 ' Similar to the facts in Sony, the
hypothetical DAT consumer received the entire copyrighted work
over the radio; thus, this factor should not weigh heavily against
him.
6Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 747 (noting that consumers may not risk purchasing
music of an unknown group, but upon hearing group's music in friend's car, they may become
new fans).
"Sony, 659 F.2d at 972 (noting that creative works should not be subject of fair use as
much as informational works). See also Nimmer, supra note 62, at 1522 (arguing that fair
use is less appropriate when using creative works).
7See, e.g., Sony, 659 F.2d at 972 (noting that fair use claim generally will not extend to
entertainment work); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217,
221 (D.N.J. 1977) (recognizing distinction between works of diligence and of originality and
granting defendant greater fair use with work of diligence).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988). See supra note 45 (providing text of statute); Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding fair use inapplicable only
where virtually complete copy had been made by infringing user), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979); Nimmer, supra note 62, at 1522-23 (arguing that home audio recording always
involves copying of entire work, and therefore, is presumptively unfair).
7o Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
7 Id. ("Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual
work, and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been
invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced
does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use.") (citations
omitted).
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4. Potential Harm to the Copyright. The final factor of the fair
use analysis addresses the potential harm to the market for and
value of the copyright."2 This factor generally is considered the
most important factor." While a commercial use may be evidence
of harm, no presumption will arise. 74  The rationale behind this
factor is that protecting a copyrighted work maintains the incentive
for the author to create and publish additional works. 5 Copyright
protection should discourage a use that threatens this incentive,
but not those that do not.7 ' Limiting a non-harmful use would
exceed the scope of copyright protection and create an unnecessari-
ly broad monopoly. 77
In the DAT hypothetical, using DAT to record an album received
over the airwaves should be prohibited if it would discourage
writers or musicians from writing and publishing new songs. If,
however, people continue to write and publish songs in spite of
DAT use, the AHRA would be an unnecessary prohibition on
society's right of access.
Considering that people continue to write and publish songs in
spite of analog taping equipment, 7 DAT recording probably will
not adversely impact the music industry. Further, analog recording
actually poses a greater threat to the music industry because it is
a cheaper copying alternative than DAT.79 Since the industry has
72 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988). See supra note 45 (providing text of this statute).
' See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (noting
that fourth factor is most important); NIMMER, supra note 33, at § 13.05[A], 13-81 (noting
that fourth factor is most central and important).
"' See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1994 WL 64738 at *10 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1994)
(noting that presumption of market harm from commercial use does not foreclose fair use
analysis).
15 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing concept of benefit to authors).
7 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1984) ("But a use
that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the
copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create.").
" Id. ("The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas
without any countervailing benefit.*).
78 Plumleigh, 8upra note 25, at 754-55.
7 Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 752. Plumleigh further argues that many consumers will
recognize that little is saved by making DAT copies. New prerecorded CDs are only a few
dollars more than blank DAT tapes, and used prerecorded CDs and new prerecorded analog
tapes are both cheaper than blank DAT tapes. Since DAT is more expensive, it is not the
dangerously cheap copying scheme alleged by the music industry. Plumleigh, supra note 25,
at 752.
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prospered in spite of blank cassette sales,s" the industry would
likely continue to prosper without the AHRA's restrictions on
access.
Based on the Sony analysis of fair use, private DAT home
recording should qualify as a fair use. Such a finding would
undercut the AHRA royalty scheme because it charges consumers
when they have a right to the free fair use of copyrighted works.
Further, the AHRA bases its royalty system on copyright holders
promising not to sue infringing consumers or DAT manufactur-
ers.81 If DAT recording is a fair use, that promise is hollow.
B. EFFECT OF THE AHRA'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER FAIR USE
Although the AHRA is an effort to protect the prosperity of the
music industry, its denial of fair use and other copyright policies
actually thwarts this goal. As VCRs demonstrate, 2 new technolo-
gies can benefit established industries and thus should be promoted
rather than restricted by copyright protection. The Sony Court
recognized the potential economic success of VCRs and that this
success would benefit copyright holders in the long run.' Based
on this recognition and the noncommercial nature of the use, the
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims of harm.'
Like the plaintiffs in Sony, the music industry has argued that
DAT threatens harm to their copyrights.' They contend that
80 Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 755 (noting that traditional analog cassette tapes outsell
both albums and compact discs).
a' 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (Supp. 1992).
82 See, e.g., Eben Shapiro, DArs Entertainment-or That's What the Audio Industry
Hopes, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 1990, at 13A (noting that over 69% of American homes have
VCRs).
83 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (noting that it
was not implausible that benefits of VCRs would accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and
advertisers because of increased audiences due to time-shifting).
84 Id. at 452-53 (rejecting plaintiffs' further argument that VCRs would decrease theater
and television rerun audiences, which would reduce value of their copyrights and discourage
advertisers from advertising during broadcasts of their works).
' See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 62, at 1523-25 (arguing that home recording has had
devastating impact for music industry, which allegedly suffers between 700 and 800 million
dollars in losses annually). But see Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 753-58 (noting that actual
music industry loss is almost impossible to determine because each blank tape sold does not
equal one lost prerecorded tape sale, and that industry overlooks benefits of increased
exposure based on hearing copies of works).
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each blank tape sold displaces a prerecorded copy sale.' This
contention lacks support. A congressional study refused to report
definitively that each blank cassette tape sale displaced the sale of
a prerecorded work. 7 Moreover, in contrast to the music indus-
try's arguments, one study found that consumers who made copies
on blank tapes bought more prerecorded works than those who did
not make copies."
Further, DAT may actually benefit the industry through its
technological advances.8 9 DAT provides better access to higher
sound quality, more computer data storage capacity, and a less
expensive alternative to studio recording.' DAT also offers an
alternative to compact disc (CD) car stereos because DAT will not
skip on bumpy roads.9' These examples demonstrate how DAT
equipment will make higher quality sound more available to
consumers, which may increase sales of both DAT and prerecorded
works on DAT tapes. In these ways, DAT is analogous to the VCR
and exemplifies how new technology can profit a given industry.
V. NEGOTIATIONS BEHIND THE LEGISLATION
According to Congress, the purpose of the AHRA is to facilitate
the importation of DAT equipment for consumers' benefit without
injuring the music industry.92 It is important, however, to consid-
er the negotiations behind the AHRA.9 The dominant parties in
the negotiations were members of the music and electronics
"Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 754.
87 Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 757.
"Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 757.
"But see infra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing questions about projected
success of DAT equipment as home consumer product).
"o Plumleigh, supra note 25, at 759 (noting that DAT equipment allows new artists and
groups to create inexpensive, high-quality demo tapes, and thus, reach new audiences).
91 Shapiro, supra note 82, at 13A.
See Audio Home Recording Bill Enactment Near, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS, Sept. 28,
1992, at 10 ("It's also 'landmark intellectual property legislation, placing the U.S. squarely
in line with the growing international consensus on how to resolve the difficult issues of new
technological uses of copyrighted works,' said Rep. Moorhead (R. Cal.), member of two panels
that handled [the] bill.").
'Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.)
3579, 3579-80.
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industries, which are in some instances the same companies. 4
The AHRA is similar to many copyright bills, which originate out
of negotiations between special interest groups due to the complexi-
ty of the issues and Congress's limited schedule.95 Although
helpful in some respects, such negotiations invariably leave
unrepresented parties without protection and often are too biased
to reach any long-term solutions. 6 The unrepresented party in
the DAT context is the American consumer, who will invariably
have to pay these royalties.97
In light of such biased negotiations, one could argue that the
AHRA is not copyright legislation at all; rather, it is a government
subsidy that guarantees profits to the music industry from the sale
of products manufactured by the electronics industry. Neither
industry minds the royalty because it will be passed on to consum-
ers as a cost of doing business.
In relying on special interest groups, Congress also may have
mistaken the commercial reality of DAT. Although the Copyright
Office predicts high royalties, there is some question if consumers
really want DAT.98 DAT's success may be hampered because DAT
equipment may be too expensive to induce consumers to switch
from their cassette or compact disc systems.99 Moreover, the delay
in DAT availability may have damaged sales because consumers
already have lost interest in DAT. 1°  This potential outcome
Shapiro, supra note 82, at 13A (noting that Sony purchased CBS record company and
that other manufacturers have followed Sony's lead); see also Michael Schrage, Congress
Should Scratch Record Industry's Parasitic Taping "Royalties", WASH. POST, August 30,1991,
at G3 (noting that like Sony, other manufacturers are buying record labels to help DAT
succeed with prerecorded material).
9 See Litman, supra note 5, at 277 (arguing that copyright law deficiencies stem from
Congress's reliance on special interest group negotiations for copyright legislation).
9Litman, supra note 5, at 277-82. Moreover, "[i]t is the seemingly inevitability of bias
against absent interests, and of narrow compromises with no durability that makes such a
process [passing legislation based on negotiations] so costly. Each time we rely on current
stakeholders to agree on a statutory scheme, they produce a scheme designed to protect
themselves against the rest of us." Litman, supra note 5, at 359.
7 Levine, supra note 18, at B8.
Ken C. Pohlmann, Where did DAT go Wrong?, STEREO REVIEW, Apr. 1992, at 17
(questioning potential success of DAT because of high cost, product introduction delays, and
limited selection availability).
9 Id.
10 See Shapiro, supra note 82, at 13A (noting also that this delay has made it possible
to work problems out of DAT equipment and improve product quality).
1994]
17
Carlisle: The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
further argues against accepting the music industry's contention
that DAT is a major threat and undermines the AHRA's function
as affording protection from this threat.
The potential failure of DAT highlights that music industry
concerns may have biased the negotiation and enactment process
of the AHRA. Arguably, the music industry realized that it had
lost money to blank analog tapes and cassette players, and in its
effort to prevent similar losses to DAT products, the industry
sought to guarantee profits for itself. In this way, the AHRA may
represent Congress's codification of the music industry's posi-
tion-at the cost of consumers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The AHRA is inconsistent with constitutional policies in the
Copyright Clause and with the Copyright Act of 1976. First, the
AHRA conflicts with constitutional policy because it grants a
copyright holder monopoly rights beyond those necessary to
encourage creativity and publication, at the cost of society's right
of access. Second, the AHRA attempts to give copyright protection
to works in the public domain by levying royalties at the time of
sale on all DAT equipment. Finally, the AHRA fails to address the
fair use doctrine, which should protect private DAT home recording
in a noncommercial context.
The deficiencies present in the AHRA may stem from the
enactment and negotiation process. The music industry and the
electronics corporations that own recording companies may have
biased the negotiation process. By deferring to these special
interest groups, Congress codified their scheme for guaranteeing
profits in conflict with society's rights under copyright law. For
these reasons, the AHRA runs counter to constitutional policies,
statutory enactments, and common sense.
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